Omari Patton v. Robert Werlinger by unknown
2015 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
2-9-2015 
Omari Patton v. Robert Werlinger 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015 
Recommended Citation 
"Omari Patton v. Robert Werlinger" (2015). 2015 Decisions. 149. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015/149 
This February is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2015 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
1 
 
ALD-078        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-2029 
___________ 
 
OMARI H. PATTON, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
ROBERT WERLINGER; BRYCE BURGETT,  
individually and in their official capacities 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 12-cv-00247) 
District Judge:  Honorable Kim R. Gibson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
January 8, 2015 
Before:  RENDELL, CHAGARES and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges  
 
(Opinion filed: February 9, 2015) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Omari Patton, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals from the District 
Court’s order granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for 
summary judgment.  For the following reasons, we will summarily affirm.  
 In December 2012, Patton commenced an action under Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), in the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania.  In his amended complaint, Patton alleged that on 
December 8, 2010, he was placed in the Special Housing Unit (“SHU”) at the Federal 
Correctional Institution in Loretto, Pennsylvania, (“FCI Loretto”) and that he was 
subsequently transferred from that facility on January 7, 2011.  Following his transfer, 
Patton was admitted to the Federal Correctional Institution in Bennettsville, South 
Carolina (“FCI Bennettsville”) on March 10, 2011.  Patton alleged that both his 
placement in the SHU and his transfer from FCI Loretto were made in retaliation for his 
filing grievances against officers at FCI Loretto and for having a phone conversation with 
one of the officers’ sisters.  Patton named as defendants Robert Werlinger, former 
Warden at FCI Loretto, and Bryce Burget, Case Manager Coordinator at FCI Loretto.  
 The defendants filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary 
judgment.  The Magistrate Judge recommended that the defendants’ motion be granted 
and that Patton’s complaint be dismissed with prejudice for failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies.1  The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s report and 
recommendation, and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.  Patton appealed.  
                                              
 1 The Magistrate Judge further recommended, in the alternative, that Patton’s 
complaint be dismissed for failure to state a claim because, even assuming that Patton 
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 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and our review of the District 
Court’s dismissal and summary judgment order is plenary.  See State Auto Prop. & Cas. 
Ins. Co. v. Pro Design, P.C., 566 F.3d 86, 89 (3d Cir. 2009) (summary judgment); Allah 
v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000) (motion to dismiss).  “To survive a 
motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 
(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  Summary 
judgment is appropriate if, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  We may affirm on any basis 
supported by the record, see Fairview Twp. v. EPA, 773 F.2d 517, 525 n.15 (3d Cir. 
1985), and may summarily affirm if the appeal does not present a substantial question.  
See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.  
 Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (“the PLRA”), a prisoner is 
required to pursue all avenues of relief available within the prison’s grievance system 
before bringing a federal civil rights action concerning prison conditions.  See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1997e(a); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001).  This “exhaustion requirement 
applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances 
                                                                                                                                                  
sufficiently pled that he engaged in constitutionally protected conduct and suffered 
adverse action, he failed to plausibly allege a causal link between his constitutionally 
protected conduct and the adverse action.  See Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 
2001).  We need not decide that issue here, because we agree with the District Court that 
Patton failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.   
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or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.”  
Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002).  
 It is uncontested that Patton failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.  After 
the Magistrate Judge filed her report and recommendation, Patton filed a motion asserting 
for the first time that he failed to exhaust his remedies because they were rendered 
“unavailable”2 to him by the staff at FCI Loretto and by the BOP Northeast Regional 
Office while Patton was in the SHU.3  Patton has presented no evidence to support this 
allegation.  Moreover, even if administrative remedies were unavailable to Patton during 
his placement in the SHU, Patton has not shown that he could not have pursued such 
remedies at FCI Bennettsville following his transfer.  Patton asserts that by the time he 
arrived at FCI Bennettsville any potential administrative remedies related to his claims 
would have been time-barred.  This argument is not persuasive.  Although an inmate 
generally has only twenty days to submit an administrative remedy request, the governing 
regulations allow this time to be extended when the inmate demonstrates a valid reason 
for delay.  28 C.F.R. § 542.14.  A “valid reason” under the regulations means “a situation 
which prevented the inmate from submitting the request within the established time 
                                              
 2 We have excused the failure to exhaust in limited circumstances when the 
grievance procedure is unavailable to the prisoner.  See, e.g., Brown v. Croak, 312 F.3d 
109, 113 (3d Cir. 2002) (prison officials’ instruction that plaintiff must delay filing 
grievance would render the grievance procedure unavailable); Camp v. Brennan, 219 
F.3d 279, 280-81 (3d Cir. 2000) (correctional officers impeding plaintiff’s ability to file a 
grievance renders grievance procedure unavailable).  
 3 Patton had earlier argued, in his response to defendants’ motion to dismiss and/or 
for summary judgment, that he failed to pursue administrative remedies because to do so 
would have been futile.  However, as the Magistrate Judge observed in her report and 
recommendation, there is no “futility” exception to the PLRA’s mandatory exhaustion 
requirement.  See Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 71 (3d Cir. 2000). 
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frame.”  See 28 C.F.R. § 542.14(b).  Valid reasons for delay include “an extended period 
in-transit during which the inmate was separated from documents needed to prepare the 
Request.”  Id.  Patton did not request an extension of time to file a request following his 
transfer, nor has he alleged that he was impeded from doing so.  Accordingly, dismissal 
of his amended complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies was proper.  
 For the foregoing reasons, there is no substantial issue on appeal and we therefore 
grant Appellees’ motion for summary action and will summarily affirm the judgment of 
the District Court, see 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. Ch. 10.6.  All other pending 
motions are denied. 
 
  
